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VICTIMS, BREEDERS, JOY, AND MATH: FIRST THOUGHTS ON
COMPENSATORY SPOUSAL PAYMENTS UNDER THE PRINCIPLES
CYNTHIA LEE STARNES*
I.  INTRODUCTION
Marriage is a risky proposition.  A promise may be broken, a trust be-
trayed, a safe haven lost.  For homemakers, the risks are even greater, for a
failed marriage may mean not only psychic loss, but severe economic loss as
well.  Such is the penalty for limiting one’s market participation in order to
shoulder the bulk of family responsibilities.  Most often, this penalty is imposed
on women, since homemakers are typically female.  As marriage endures, a
homemaker’s risk increases, for even as her economic vulnerability grows, cul-
ture and law combine to create incentives for her husband to shed her.1  While
this storyline certainly does not describe all married women, it is common
enough to have sparked concern among numerous feminist commentators.2
Now comes the American Law Institute with its Principles of the Law of Fam-
ily Dissolution.3  The Principles frankly describe the disparate economic position-
ing of many divorcing men and women with a candor that forces a much-
needed realism into reform discourse.  Generally avoiding questions of the
moral legitimacy of gender roles, the Principles focus instead on the practical re-
alities of homemaking.4  The costs of homemaking, as the Principles note, are
most apparent in the case of a traditional wife in a long-term marriage who
foregoes market investment and consequently “is likely to be left at divorce with
undeveloped earning potential.”5  Although these “Betty Crockers”6 may be
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1. Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi-Rents; or, “I Gave Him the Best Years of My Life,” 16
J. LEGAL STUD. 267, 273-78 (1987); Ira Mark Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1, 40-44
(1989).
2. See, e.g., Martha M. Ertman, Commercializing Marriage: A Proposal for Valuing Women’s Work
Through Premarital Security Agreements, 77 TEX. L. REV. 17 (1998); Jane Rutherford, Duty in Divorce:
Shared Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539 (1990); Jana B. Singer, Divorce Reform and
Gender Justice, 67 N.C. L. REV. 1103 (1989); Katherine Silbaugh, Turning Labor into Love: Housework and
the Law, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 1 (1996); Cynthia Starnes, Divorce and the Displaced Homemaker: A Discourse
on Playing with Dolls, Partnership Buyouts and Dissociation Under No-Fault, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 67 (1993);
Joan Williams, Married Women and Property, 1 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 383 (1994).
3. PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ch. 5
(Proposed Final Draft, Part I, 1997) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES 1997].
4. See generally ANN CRITTENDEN, THE PRICE OF MOTHERHOOD (2001).
5. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.05 cmt. c.
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partially able to recoup their market losses, “the process, neither easy nor as-
sured, grows more difficult with the passage of time.”7  Less immediately ap-
parent, but no less real, are the homemaking costs experienced by wives “in the
more usual modern arrangement in which both spouses are employed outside
the home.”8  Even in this two-working-parent family, a woman typically serves
as the primary caretaker of children, a role that often leads her to “choose work
that will fit around . . . family responsibilities, a complication and impediment to
occupational advancement not faced by most men.”9  As the Principles observe,
the caretaking role “typically results in a residual loss in earning capacity that
continues after the children no longer require close parental supervision.10  In
these observations, the Principles formally acknowledge what even brief reflec-
tion should disclose: people who spend time doing the cooking, the cleaning, the
washing, the shopping, and the reading of bedtime stories to small persons have
less time to invest in a career.  Recognition of this reality and its market implica-
tions is critical to achieving fairness at divorce.
Current divorce statutes typically authorize courts to divide marital prop-
erty and award alimony under a broad discretionary standard that suggests
relevant factors, but ultimately defers to an individual judge’s sense of fair
play.11  Not the least of the dangers inherent in such a system is the possibility
that an egalitarian-minded, well-intentioned judge will unrealistically assume
spouses are equally opportuned at divorce.  Such a judge may equally divide
minimal marital property, and award little or no alimony.  Each spouse then,
theoretically at least, will enjoy a clean break and a fresh start, though on a de-
cidedly different economic footing.  The shield that once protected the married
homemaker from her market opportunity costs is thus abruptly removed, and
she is left alone to bear those costs,12 even as her husband is left alone to enjoy
any gains resulting from his fuller market participation.  If the law incorrectly
assumes such husbands and wives are equally positioned at divorce, it effec-
tively penalizes the wife whose human capital has deteriorated during marriage
and rewards the husband whose human capital has increased.  Such a scenario
goes far in explaining the persistently troubling statistics on the disparate finan-
cial impact of divorce on men and women,13 and its possibility haunts every
homemaker who negotiates a divorce settlement.14
6. See Cynthia Lee Starnes, Reflections on Betty Crocker, Soccer Mom and Divorce: A Message from
Detergent Manufacturers, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 285.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, WOMEN IN THE AMERICAN ECONOMY 7
(1986).
10. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.06 cmt. a.
11. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 307, 9A U.L.A. 288 (1987) (authorizing a court
to “equitably apportion” property); see also id. § 308(a)-(b), 9A U.L.A. 446 (providing that a court
“may” award maintenance “in amounts and for periods of time the court deems just”).
12. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.06 cmt. a.
13. In 1985, Lenore Weitzman reported that women and children’s standard of living dropped
by 73% the first year after divorce, while men’s standard of living rose by 42%.  See LENORE J.
WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION 323 (1985).  While Weitzman’s figures were controversial,
most critics attacked the extent of the reported disparity, rather than its existence.  See, e.g., SUSAN
FALUDI, BACKLASH: THE UNDECLARED WAR AGAINST AMERICAN WOMEN 19-25 (1991) (citing a study
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The ALI’s answer to this scenario is a detailed set of presumptive alimony
rules designed to ensure a more equitable allocation of loss.  Even as we ap-
plaud the Principles’ frank realism and bold effort to restructure the law of ali-
mony, however, we critics must begin the process of questioning them.  Espe-
cially deserving of first blush scrutiny is the Principles’ choice of a victimization
model rather than one based on equal partnership, its breeder/non-breeder di-
chotomy, its remarriage penalty, and its quantification methodology.  Such
scrutiny hopefully will guide reform rather than deter it, and so ultimately fa-
cilitate the Principles’ laudable goal of a more equitable sharing of the economic
risks of marriage.
II.  REDESIGNING ALIMONY
Chapter 5 of the Principles offers an ambitious new scheme for alimony,
which is recast as compensatory spousal payments.  The overarching goal of this
chapter is to replace the need-based, discretionary standard of current law with
a set of more carefully tailored presumptive rules designed to allocate loss “ac-
cording to equitable principles that are consistent and predictable in applica-
tion.”15  This new regime is detailed in two major topics.  Generally, Topic 2 ap-
plies to “longer” marriages while Topic 3 applies to “shorter” ones.16
Topic 2 identifies three types of loss for which compensation is presump-
tively appropriate: (1) a loss of marital living standard in a marriage of “suffi-
cient duration”;17 (2) an earning capacity loss incurred by a primary caretaker of
children;18 and (3) an earning capacity loss incurred by a spouse caring for a
“sick, elderly, or disabled third party in fulfillment of a moral obligation.”19
These Topic 2 awards generally measure loss by calculating the spouses’ income
disparity and multiplying that figure by a “durational factor” based on the
length of the marriage or the caretaking period.20  Each Topic 2 section invites
states to adopt a “rule of statewide application” to establish both the triggering
parameters of the presumption of entitlement21 and the quantification mecha-
nism for a resulting award.22
Unlike their Topic 2 counterparts, Topic 3 awards will likely be available
only to a small group of qualifying spouses.  Topic 3 authorizes compensation
for: (1) a spouse who divorces before receiving a “fair return” on an investment
showing a 30% temporary decline in women’s living standards and a 10 to 15% rise in men’s living
standards).  Recently, Weitzman acknowledged that the numbers were actually closer to 27% and
10%, respectively.  See Katherine Webster, Post-Divorce Wealth Gap Was Wrong, Agrees Author,
SEATTLE TIMES, May 19, 1996, at A3.
14. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of Di-
vorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 952-54 (1979).
15. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.02(1).
16. Id. § 5.02 cmt. a.
17. Id. § 5.05.
18. Id. § 5.06.
19. Id. § 5.12.
20. Id. §§ 5.05(2)-(3), 5.06(2), (4), 5.12(2).
21. This triggering factor is the length of the marriage in section 5.05 and the length of the care-
taking period in sections 5.06 and 5.12.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, §§ 5.05-06, 5.12.
22. Id. §§ 5.05(2)-(3), 5.06(2), 5.06(4), 5.12(2).
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in the other spouse’s earning capacity23 and (2) a spouse who is disparately able
to recover her premarital living standard after a short marriage.24  These sections
appear designed to protect two paradigmatic claimants: (1) the spouse who
supported a mate through professional school and who divorces before the de-
gree or license generates significant property,25 and (2) the spouse who relocates
to further the other spouse’s career, while compromising her own.26  Given their
restitutionary basis, Topic 3 awards are nonmodifiable.27
III.  RECASTING BEGGARS AS VICTIMS
The Principles charge much of the inadequacy of current law to its failure to
identify a conceptual basis for alimony.28  Current alimony statutes typically
empower a judge to award alimony upon a claimant’s demonstration of need,29
though they offer no explanation for the implicit tenet that one party is obliged
to redress the other’s need.30  While alms giving may be morally ennobling, it is
not generally legally compelled.  The law’s failure to provide a reasoned basis
for alimony combines with the broad discretionary powers of trial courts to cre-
ate a system in which alimony is hugely and capriciously unpredictable.
The Principles’ solution to this problem is to conceptualize alimony as com-
pensation for loss.  So viewed, alimony’s purpose is the “equitable reallocation
of the losses arising from the marital failure,”31 a characterization that “trans-
forms the claimant’s petition from a plea for help to a claim of entitlement.”32
According to its drafters, however, this new model does less to change the need-
based scheme of current law than to explain it.33  The “intuition that the former
spouse has an obligation to meet need,” they reason, “arises from the perception
that the need results from the unfair allocation of the financial losses arising
from the marital failure.”34  The Principles’ solution is thus to recast the beggar of
current law as a victim.
While there is little doubt that current law suffers from the absence of a ra-
tional basis for alimony, the Principles’ answer to this problem may not be the
23. Id.§ 5.15.
24. Id. § 5.16.
25. Id. § 5.15 cmt. a.
26. Id. § 5.16 cmt. b, illus. 2.
27. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, §§ 5.15(5), 5.16(5).
28. Id. § 5.02 cmt. d.
29. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 308(b), 9A U.L.A. 446 (1998). (authorizing a
court to award maintenance after considering factors including the claimant’s financial resources,
age, physical and emotional condition and the “time necessary to acquire sufficient education or
training to enable the party seeking maintenance to find appropriate employment”).
30. See Ellman, supra note 1.
31. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.02 cmt. a.
32. Id.  The extent to which this award is actually an entitlement, is cast into question, however,
by later provisions authorizing termination of a spousal award.  See infra notes 61-74 and accompa-
nying text.
33. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.02 cmt. a.  Given the inconsistencies in existing law,
however, the Principles’ claim may demonstrate more modesty than accuracy, as the consistency and
predictability they champion would themselves work a dramatic change in existing law.
34. Id.
STARNES - FMT.DOC 09/20/01  9:28 AM
COMPENSATORY SPOUSAL PAYMENTS 141
best one.  Since the vast majority of alimony claimants are women,35 the Princi-
ples’ victimization model makes a statement about a woman’s value in marriage,
and it is a disparaging one.  A wife’s right to income sharing depends, not on her
status as a stakeholder in marriage, but, rather, on her claim that her loss is se-
vere enough to require her husband, the true stakeholder in the relationship, to
take responsibility for her.  Like the “progressive” rehabilitative alimony stat-
utes of no-fault divorce laws, the underlying theme is that a damaged woman
requires compensation and, perhaps, rehabilitation so that she may “rise from
vice to become a sound, productive citizen.”36  The supporting and disturbing
model is that of breakdown and repair, failure and success, turpitude and re-
demption.
The Principles’ decision to cast alimony claimants as victims might be less
objectionable if it were more necessary.  It is not.  A sounder model for income
sharing could be based on a view of spouses as equal partners.  As equal part-
ners, spouses presumptively make many mutual commitments, involving emo-
tional, spiritual, and sexual issues, as well as the financial commitment to share
family income.37  Under a partnership model, a spouse with disparately low
earnings is neither a beggar nor a victim, but rather, an equal stakeholder and
contributor in marriage entitled at divorce to share any gains the marriage pro-
duced.38  Numerous commentators39 have urged such a model, loosely drawn
from contract or partnership principles.
As an example of the essential differences between the Principles’ victimi-
zation model and a model based on equal partnership, take the case of the tra-
ditional marriage between a homemaker, whose market earnings have been
minimized by long term caretaking responsibilities, and a breadwinner, whose
earnings have been maximized by more concerted market participation.  Under
the Principles this homemaker’s right to alimony would depend on her status as
a victim of marriage, i.e., on her lost opportunities, including her “lost opportu-
nity to have had children with someone with whom she would enjoy an endur-
35. The evidence is that alimony has never been awarded to more than a small proportion of
divorcing women.  In 1990, the Bureau of the Census reported that only 16.8% of the 19.3 million
ever-divorced and currently separated women (as of 1987) were entitled to receive alimony under
the divorce decree.  BUREAU OF CENSUS, U.S. DEP’T COMMERCE, CURRENT POPULUATION REPORTS -
CHILD SUPPORT AND ALIMONY 11 (1990).
36. See Starnes, supra note 2, at 98.
37. See Williams, supra note 2, at 404, (stating that “[a]t divorce, the family wage is abruptly re-
defined as the personal property of the husband.”).
38. The Principles’ general rejection of an expectation model may be due in part to their rejection
of the contract model that would support it.  Observing that “contract principles allow an expecta-
tion award only against a party in breach,” the drafters conclude that a contract model conflicts with
the principle of no-fault divorce law.  ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.05 cmt. b.  This is not
necessarily true.  Actually, contract itself adopts a no-fault approach to remedies in its refusal to
award punitive damages.  Fundamentally, contract law recognizes the right of a party to end the
contractual relationship and imposes no penalty on the party who chooses to do so, often for reasons
of self-interest, including efficiency.  While the contracting party is not compelled to continue the
contractual relationship (i.e., specific performance of the contract is not ordinarily ordered) she must
compensate her contract partner for her nonperformance.  In the context of marriage, nonperform-
ance or breach of the economic compact of marriage could be defined as a refusal to share the family
wage.  The remedy for such a “breach” would be based on some degree of income sharing.
39. See, e.g., Singer, supra note 2; Starnes, supra note 2; Williams, supra note 2.
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ing relationship.”40  The focus is on injury, and the determinative issue is the ex-
tent to which the homemaker has been damaged.  Under a partnership model,
this same homemaker’s right to alimony would depend on her status as an
equal stakeholder and contributor to marriage.41  The focus is on gain, i.e., the
family wage, and the determinative issue is the extent to which the home-
maker’s status as an equal partner entitles her to share that wage.
While it is important to acknowledge the market costs many women incur
during marriage as they prioritize family responsibilities, it is equally important
that these women not be cast as losers.  By choosing a model that characterizes
alimony claimants as victims rather than equal partners, the Principles send an
unnecessary and disdainful message to married women whose homemaking
role compromises their ability to earn market wages.
IV.  THE BREEDER42/NON-BREEDER MODEL
In what is surely a well intentioned, if misguided, effort to ensure that
homemakers are fairly compensated for their lost opportunities, the Principles
establish a two-tier alimony scheme that distinguishes breeding women from
non-breeding ones.  Good intentions will not rescue this scheme from its offen-
sive concept nor from its problematic application.
Section 5.06 authorizes compensatory spousal payments for the spouse
with an “earning capacity loss arising from his or her disproportionate share
during marriage of the care of the marital children, or of the children of either
spouse.”43  Under this section, a “presumption of entitlement arises” if: (1)
marital children lived with the claimant for a minimum period specified in a
“rule of statewide application”; and (2) the claimant’s earning capacity is “sub-
stantially less” than that of the other spouse.44  This presumption does not arise,
however, if a court determines that the claimant did not provide “substantially
more than half” of the total care both spouses together provided for the chil-
dren.45  An award under section 5.06 may be combined with a section 5.05 award
(based on marital duration and income disparity),46 though the total award may
not exceed the maximum authorized by section 5.05.47  Thus, the effect of section
40. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.06 cmt. e.
41. In many cases, this contribution will include performance of a disproportionate share of the
parties’ joint parenting responsibilities.
42. See In re Marriage of Branter, 136 Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (“A woman is not a
breeding cow to be nurtured during her years of fecundity, then conveniently and economically
converted to cheap steaks when past her prime . . . .”).
43. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.06; see also id. § 5.12 (discussing third parties in gen-
eral and creating a similar accelerated right to income-sharing for a spouse who has cared for third
parties).
44. Id. § 5.06(2).
45. Id. § 5.06(3).
46. Id. § 5.06(5).
47. Id.  Topic 3 awards are unavailable to the spouse whose “aggregate entitlement under Topic
2 is substantial.” ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.03(4)(b) (emphasis added).  One may wonder,
of course, what constitutes a substantial award.
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5.06 is to authorize accelerated compensation for the primary caretaker of minor
children.48
Since the vast majority of primary caretakers are women,49 section 5.06
makes a statement about women and it is a disturbingly regressive one.  A
woman’s right vis-à-vis her husband depends on whether she has borne him a
child.50  In effect, the Principles’ breeder/non-breeder model conditions a
woman’s status as a stakeholder in marriage on her ability to establish an at-
tachment to a child.  Under this scheme, women take on rights through their
children rather than through their individual adult contribution to the marital
partnership.  Women who cannot establish an attachment to a child take on a
lesser status than those who can.  The legal system, evidently, has less interest in
furthering or protecting a woman’s stake in marriage to the extent it is separate
from a child-bearing function.51  This message devalues all women.
The section 5.06 decision to disfavor non-breeding women seems curiosly
inconsistent with the Principles’ general refusal to engage in a post hoc appraisal
of the value of marital roles.  “Divorcing individuals,” the drafters observe, “are
likely to believe that the allocation of resources and responsibilities during their
marriage was unfair.”52  It is only when the marriage ends and disparate earning
potential revealed that the parties argue, possibly for the first time, an unfair
distribution of labor during the marriage.  The Principles wisely reject such con-
tentions,53 reasoning that any spousal complaint about marital roles is under-
mined by the reality of unilateral divorce which “makes it impossible for either
spouse to impose an inequitable arrangement on the other.”54
Yet in section 5.06, the Principles evidence a willingness to engage in the
very post hoc evaluation of marital roles they disdain.  “The spouse who sacri-
fices career prospects to care for the couple’s children, in reliance upon the other
spouse’s income, has a claim for that reliance loss” the drafters reason, but “the
spouse who sacrifices career prospects to pursue a passion for golf, in reliance
upon the other spouse’s income, does not.”55  Evidently, the Principles are willing
to set aside their objections to post hoc evaluations of the spouses’ roles when
necessary to discount the claims of non-breeding women.  Yet, according to the
Principles’ own reasoning, if the parties found the distribution of labor in the
childless marriage inequitable, they could have ended it.  Moreover, the Princi-
ples’ report card will sometimes mistake the self-indulgent spouse for the selfless
48. Id. § 5.06.  Section 5.12 creates a similar right to income-sharing for a spouse who has cared
for certain third parties, a situation that presumably will be much less common than that giving rise
to a claim under 5.06.  Id. § 5.12.
49. See Silbaugh, supra note 2, at 8-14; David H. Demo & Alan C. Acock, Family Diversity and the
Division of Domestic Labor: How Much Have Things Realy Changed? 42 FAM. REL. 323, 326 (1993).
50. The seriously offended might suggest that the next step is to assert that the most valuable
women are those who have borne a male child.
51. One might argue that such a view relegates childless marriages to the second class status
largely reserved for same-sex relationships.  For this thought, I owe my colleague Mae Kuykendall.
52. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.02 cmt. c.
53. Id. § 5.06 cmt. d (stating that “[m]arital stories have countless variations, but the measure of
recovery cannot be made to turn on an inquiry into their details”).
54. Id. § 5.02 cmt. c.
55. Id. § 5.03 cmt. b.
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one, for even as it weeds out the golfing wife, it weeds out the hard-working
humanitarian wife who devoted long hours to the homeless, the parentless, and
the AIDS-stricken, perhaps with the encouragement of her spouse.  Neither the
parties nor the Principles wisely engage in post hoc value judgments of the par-
ties’ “[m]arital stories [with their] countless variations.”56
In addition to the conceptual concerns it raises, section 5.06 raises serious
practical concerns.  Section 5.06 allows a spouse to avoid a presumption of enti-
tlement by showing that the claimant did not perform a disproportionate share
of parenting responsibilities.57  One can imagine the temptation, especially in
high stakes or other contentious cases, to litigate questions such as: Did Mom
perform 60% or only 40% of the caretaking?  Does one hour of coaching Little
League equal one hour of reading bedtime stories, of cooking family meals, of
washing children’s clothes, of helping with the homework, of vacuuming the
living room?  These questions are unanswerable and inappropriate.
All these concerns might be minimized if section 5.06 were really necessary
to achieve equity for a homemaker.  It is not.  Section 5.05 already compensates a
spouse, including a primary caretaker, for a disparate loss of the marital living
standard.  Any disparity in earning capacity caused by caretaking will thus al-
ready provide a basis for recovery under section 5.05. If the progression of in-
come sharing under section 5.05 is too slow to achieve equity for primary care-
takers, then it should be accelerated for all claimants.  Mothering is clearly a
valuable social function, and the Principles’ effort to force recognition of the costs
of caretaking is an important contribution to reform efforts.  Nevertheless, states
should decline to adopt section 5.06,58 if not for the offensive message it sends,
then surely for the practical struggles it invites.
V.  GENDERED OPPORTUNITIES FOR JOY: THE REMARRIAGE PENALTY
In a day when a woman was viewed as a man’s chattel, logic required that
a husband’s duty to support his wife terminate when she became the property
of another man.  In a day when, at least in proper rhetoric, a woman is viewed
as a man’s equal, a rule terminating spousal payments upon a wife’s remarriage
is more difficult to justify.  Nevertheless, despite their repeated incantations of
entitlement,59 the Principles adopt a rule that spousal payments terminate auto-
56. Id. § 5.06 cmt. d.
57. Id. § 5.06(3).
58. Similar objections apply to section 5.12, which states should also decline to adopt. See ALI
PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.12.
59. See id. at 280 (titling Topic 2’s caption “Entitlements Based on the Parties’ Disparate Financial
Capacity”) (emphasis added); id. § 5.05(1) (stating “a person married to someone of significantly
greater wealth or earning capacity is entitled at dissolution to compensation”) (emphasis added); id. §
5.05(2) (stating “presumption of entitlement arises in marriages of specified duration and spousal in-
come disparity”) (emphasis added); id. § 5.06(1) (stating “a spouse should be entitled at dissolution to
compensation for the earning capacity loss arising from his or her disproportionate share during
marriage of the care . . . of children”) (emphasis added); id. § 5.06(2) (stating “presumption of entitle-
ment arises”) (emphasis added).
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matically upon a recipient’s remarriage.60  Under this rule, termination does not
depend upon an inquiry into the financial impact of the remarriage, but on the
fact of marriage itself.61
The rationale?  First, it is always done.62  Second, it is cheap.63 Third, remar-
riage ends the obligor’s responsibility.64
The fact that something is always done is a dubious rationale for continu-
ing an inequitable practice.  And cheap is not always better.  It is unlikely that an
alimony recipient would much appreciate the litigation costs the law has saved
her by automatically terminating her alimony.
The real question is thus whether the Principles’ third rationale supports
automatic termination.  Why exactly does an obligor’s responsibility for a claim-
ant’s loss end upon her remarriage?  The most obvious answer reeks of a
woman as chattel philosophy: the wife now belongs to a new man who has
taken responsibility for her.  When she is passed on to another male provider,
her former provider may wash his hands of her.  Such reasoning smacks of a
Cinderella complex,65 implicit in the drafters’ observation that “[f]or the di-
vorced woman the surest path to financial recovery is remarriage.”66
As the drafters’ explanation for the remarriage penalty continues, it wors-
ens.  “Personal intimacy and exclusivity,” they explain, “contribut[e] impor-
tantly to the law’s willingness to find obligations that survive dissolution. . .  To
require support of the second marriage by the first spouse would cast doubt on
the second marriage’s authenticity.”67  The reference to “personal intimacy and
exclusivity” as part of the idealized model for marriage suggests that the ration-
ale for automatic termination lies somewhere in the emotional and sexual nature
of the spouses’ relationship, a disturbing implication suggesting that a hus-
band’s obligation to make payments to a former wife depends upon her con-
tinuing, if theoretical, emotional and sexual availability to him.  Once she enters
a new marriage and therefore a new idealized model of intimacy, she becomes
60. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.08.  This automatic termination rule applies to pay-
ments under sections 5.05 and 5.06, but does not apply to the restitutionary-based payments under
Topic 3.  Id. §§ 5.15(5), 5.16(5).
61. An exception is provided for special cases in which termination would work “a substantial
injustice because of facts not present in most cases.”  Id. § 5.08(2).  As comment d explains, “[r]are
cases may present unusual facts that make application of the automatic termination rule seriously
unjust.” Id. § 5.08(2) cmt. d.  Illustration 4 gives as an example of such an unusual fact pattern, dis-
solution of a thirty year marriage, a wife who three years later marries a man who is already married
to someone else and who dies one month after the remarriage. Id. § 5.08(2) cmt. d, illus. 4.  Obvi-
ously, this is not an exception the drafters foresee as available in an ordinary case.
62. Id. § 5.08 cmt. a (stating that automatic termination “is consistent with the rule applied to
traditional alimony awards in every state”).
63. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.08 cmt. c (stating that automatic termination “elimi-
nates the cost of modifying the original decree”).
64. Id. § 5.08 cmt. a.
65. See COLETTE DOWLING, THE CINDERELLA COMPLEX 31 (1981).
66. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.07 cmt. c, reporter’s note at 348.  By terminating pay-
ments on remarriage, the drafters achieve the additional goal of cutting the ties between the parties,
a result they deem “generally good for both the individuals and the legal system, which may other-
wise remain involved in their domestic affairs.”  Id. § 5.07 cmt. a.
67. Id. § 5.08 cmt. a.
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for the first time legally unavailable to him emotionally and sexually, and, pre-
sumably for this reason, his duty to make payments to her ends.
Equally disturbing is the drafters’ sudden reference to psychic loss to jus-
tify their automatic termination rule.  Such non-financial psychic loss includes
“the failed expectation of having a close and caring lifetime companion.”68  The
drafters explain that the sections on compensatory spousal payments limit com-
pensation to financial loss because of the “impracticality of measuring the non-
financial losses.”69  Upon remarriage, however, “the inference naturally arises
that the obligee derives great rewards overall from the new relationship.”70
Thus, psychic losses are recovered and the entitlement to compensation disap-
pears.  But what of continuing financial losses?  This abrupt, selective shift from
a model of alimony as compensation for financial loss to a model based on psy-
chic loss makes for a dubious, if convenient, rationale for terminating alimony.
The practical implications of the automatic termination rule are serious in-
deed.  Since 75% of divorcing women ultimately remarry,71 the remarriage pen-
alty has a sweeping and sometimes disastrous impact.  Consider, for example, a
law professor’s worst-case hypothetical on remarriage.  After thirty years as a
traditional homemaker and three children, Betty Crocker’s high-income hus-
band, Adam, divorces her, leaving her heartbroken and vulnerable.  Six months
after her divorce, Betty is swept away by the attentions of Clark, an unemployed
writer, whom she soon marries.  Clark, however, is not the guy he appeared to
be and his philandering leads Betty to divorce him soon after the wedding.  The
consequence of Betty’s brief, ill-fated relationship with Clark is that Betty, after
thirty years of marriage and three children, loses her entitlement to payments
from Adam.  The rationale?  She should not have married Clark.  No one seems
able to explain, however, why any wife, including the long term homemaker,
should not enjoy the opportunity to begin life afresh that her husband enjoys at
the end of their marriage.
Ultimately, the question goes to the nature of compensatory spousal pay-
ments.  Are they based on a husband’s duty to support a wife, with all the
overtones of chattel and sexual fidelity historically implicit in that duty?  Or are
they rather based on a wife’s entitlement as an equal partner in marriage?  If
spousal payments are truly an entitlement as the Principles claim, they should
not terminate automatically upon remarriage.
VI.  THE MATHEMATICS OF LOSS
To achieve their objective of consistency and predictability in compensa-
tory spousal payments, the Principles invite states to adopt “a rule of statewide
application,” which generally measures a claimant’s loss by calculating the
spouses’ income disparity and multiplying that figure by a “durational factor”
based on the length of the marriage or caretaking period.72  The Principles thus
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.07 cmt. c, reporter’s note at 349 (citing ANDREW J.
CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 29-30 (1981)).
72. Id. §§ 5.05(2)-(3), 5.06(2), 5.06(4), 5.12(2).
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provide only a framework for reform, the specifics of which are left to subse-
quent state action.  In their extensive discussion of the basic alimony regime set
out in section 5.05, the Principles make at least two suggestions states should de-
cline to follow.
First, states should decline the Principles’ invitation to establish a proba-
tionary marital period during which no presumption of entitlement arises.  The
basic scheme of section 5.05(1) is to condition spousal payments on a marriage
“of sufficient duration” that equity requires compensation.73  The underlying
principle is that a claimant must have been “married to a person of greater
wealth or earning capacity long enough that the reduced standard of living oth-
erwise experienced by the claimant after dissolution ‘is equitably treated as the
spouse’s joint responsibility.’”74  While the principle of increasing interdepend-
ence over time is not objectionable, the proposition that this principle begins to
operate, not at the beginning of marriage, but only after a designated probation-
ary period is objectionable.  This scheme suggests that commitment and reliance
are appropriate only if the marriage endures.  Evidently, the marital vows do
not themselves create a compensable expectation or reliance that justifies post-
divorce income sharing.  In its early years, marriage takes on a probationary as-
pect that more closely resembles cohabitation than marriage. This scheme de-
values the initial marital commitment.
Moreover, it is not clear on what principled basis a state could define the
“sufficient duration” necessary to trigger marital rights.  While the Principles
themselves do not define the designated threshold period, they do suggest, by
way of illustration, that such a term might be set at five years.75  But, why is five
years better than three?  Better than seven?
No matter how “sufficient duration” is defined, the definition may create a
distorting incentive for the higher wage-earner to terminate the relationship
prior to that threshold period.  The Principles’ five-year threshold, for example,
would give a higher wage earner an incentive to terminate the marriage at 4.9
years in order to avoid a presumption of compensatory spousal payments, a re-
sult the drafters surely could not intend.  On balance, states would be well ad-
vised to reject the Principles’ suggestion of a probationary marital period.
Second, states should reject the income sharing progression suggested in
the drafters’ illustrations.  Setting the “durational factor” under section 5.05 is a
“key policy” decision that will determine the percentage of income sharing
based on the length of the marriage.76  By way of illustration, the drafters suggest
a durational factor equal to the number of years of marriage multiplied by .01.
As applied, this factor would produce a compensatory spousal payment of 5%
of any disparity in earnings after 5 years of marriage, 10% after 10 years and
20% after 20 years, with a maximum payment of 40% of the disparity in earnings
73. Id. § 5.05(1).
74. Id. § 5.05 cmt. a.
75. Id. § 5.05 cmt. a, illus. 1.
76. Id. § 5.05 cmt. g.
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after 40 years of marriage.77  Application of this durational factor suggests some
disturbing results.  Consider the case of the long term homemaker of twenty
years whose husband’s expected monthly income is $5,000 but whose own ex-
pected income is only $1,000.  Under the illustration’s durational factor of .01,
such a homemaker would receive $800 per month (20% of $4,000), giving her an
expected income of $1,800, and leaving her spouse with monthly income of
$4,200.  Such a result perpetuates, with increased certainty, the disparate impact
of divorce.
A more equitable durational factor might be drawn from the Uniform Pro-
bate Code.  The drafters of the Probate Code base a spouse’s elective share of an
augmented estate on the length of the marriage.  Interestingly, they describe this
sliding scale percentage as “the first step in the overall plan of implementing a
partnership or marital sharing theory of marriage, with a support theory back-
up.”78  Using the Probate Code as a model would produce a compensatory
spousal payment of 15% of any income disparity after 5 years, 30% of any dis-
parity after 10 years, and 50% of any disparity after 15 years.79  Whether or not
states like the Probate Code formula, they should reject the harsh formula pro-
vided in the drafters’ illustrations.
VII.  CONCLUSION
The Principles take a powerful step in both their candid recognition of the
disparate positioning of many husbands and wives at divorce, and their deter-
mination to inject certainty and equity into an alimony regime that has long
been haphazard and inequitable.  Their answer to the problems of current law,
77. As the drafters note, this maximum award level may well be reached before 40 years if a
section 5.05 award is combined with one under section 5.06, as where a claimant has been the pri-
mary caretaker of children. ALI PRINCIPLES 1997, supra note 3, § 5.06 cmt. e.
78. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 103 (1998).
79. Id. § 2-202, 8 U.L.A. 102, which establishes the following scale:
If the decedent and the spouse
were married to each other:
The elective-share
Percentage is:
Less than 1 yr. ........................................................................ Supplemental Amount Only
1 yr. but less than 2 yr. .......................................................... 3% of augmented estate
2 yr. but less than 3 yr. .......................................................... 6% of augmented estate
3 yr. but less than 4 yr. .......................................................... 9% of augmented estate
4 yr. but less than 5 yr. .......................................................... 12% of augmented estate
5 yr. but less than 6 yr. .......................................................... 15% of augmented estate
6 yr. but less than 7 yr. .......................................................... 18% of augmented estate
7 yr. but less than 8 yr. .......................................................... 21% of augmented estate
8 yr. but less than 9 yr. .......................................................... 24% of augmented estate
9 yr. but less than 10 yr. ........................................................ 27% of augmented estate
10 yr. but less than 11 yr. ...................................................... 30% of augmented estate
11 yr. but less than 12 yr. ...................................................... 34% of augmented estate
12 yr. but less than 13 yr. ...................................................... 38% of augmented estate
13 yr. but less than 14 yr. ...................................................... 42% of augmented estate
14 yr. but less than 15 yr. ...................................................... 46% of augmented estate
15 yr. or more ......................................................................... 50% of augmented estate
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however, should be carefully scrutinized.  At the core of their alimony model is
a troublesome characterization of women as victims, a casting the drafters adopt
in preference to the more egalitarian model offered by partnership.  Specifically,
states should decline sections 5.06 and 5.12, which raise troublesome conceptual
and practical concerns, and reject the remarriage penalty. The basic income-
sharing model of section 5.05 should be enthusiastically embraced, even as
states begin the deliberative and cautious discourse necessary to identify “rules
of statewide application” that will make the law of alimony not merely more
predictable, but more equitable.
